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ABSTRACT
This paper uses two Asian case studies to illustrate the issues that developers of virtual worlds
should address as they mature. The Korean case emphasizes the phenomenon of item trading.
This involves emergent markets linking real world currency to items existing on company
servers. The practice has resulted in controversial and unresolved legal issues. Companies such
as ItemBay have grown to take advantage of these opportunities. The Chinese case emphasizes
the transformation of business models over time as well as community control. The paper
discusses feedback effects between broadband adoption and online games as well as issues such
as Waigua, private servers, virtual property trade, and developer control. The experience of these
countries shows that initial technical challenges for business models were overcome but new
ones are beginning to emerge as the industry evolves. The new environment requires a change in
the assumptions under which the game industry has operated.
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This paper uses a business model framework to help identify the issues that developers of virtual
worlds (VWs) have to address as their enterprises mature. While most virtual worlds have adopt
ed subscription models there is an increasing trend toward digital item sale. This arises from the
emergent markets linking real world currency to items existing on company servers. This prac
tice has resulted in controversial and unresolved legal issues. This paper identifies the challenges
that developers of VWs will face in their efforts to find viable business models and address is
sues of control. Two Asian case studies, from Korea and China, illustrate these ideas. The Kore
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an case focuses on the phenomenon of item trading while the Chinese case emphasizes business
models.

While VWs have existed for less than a decade, they are growing rapidly and have become a
mainstream form of entertainment in some areas of the world. Game environments are becoming
more immersive and compelling and if this rate of improvement continues, such as through
growing broadband penetration, they are likely to become as common as other forms of
entertainment.

VIRTUAL WORLDS IN KOREA
Korea is one of the leading countries in terms of broadband access in the world. Statistics from
the National Internet Development Agency of Korea (NIDA) [1] indicate that 68.8% of all Kore
an households have Internet access at home. Primary reasons for accessing the Internet are to
search for data and information (72.8%), to play games (52.5%) and to use e-mail (51.3%).

One of the first item auction agencies, ItemBay, was set up in Korea in 2001 to facilitate
transactions of digital items used in virtual worlds. The early success of this trading business,
with over $200 million in transactions in 2004, has prompted further entry and the number of
item trade companies is known to exceed 300 in Korea alone.

Even in Korea, which is facing governance issues regarding digital property before any other
country, the issue is not yet settled. According to Hye-Jin Han of ItemBay, game developers
have differing positions on this issue. Large game developers such as NCSoft strongly object to
item transactions. Small game developers, on the other hand, believe that the existence of thirdparty item trade agencies such as ItemBay attract more players to their games. This results in
greater flexibility as people are able to trade items of one game for items from another game,
thus facilitating entry into smaller virtual worlds. The company ItemBay has pursued strategic
relationships with small game developers.

In a 2003 survey by the Korea Game Development & Promotion Institute (KGDI) [2], 18.7% of
companies stated that item transactions should be banned and regulated as illegal activity; 29.7%
believed that item transaction should be accepted but regulation of transactions should be
reinforced; 19.8% said that item transaction is desirable and should be encouraged but should
have a transaction limit; 27.5% said that transaction of items is a transaction between individuals
based on their free will and it should not be regulated; 2.2% said that item transaction should be
legally accepted and encouraged.
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Most of the disputes related to transactions of digital items are caused by fraud. Fraud takes
place under the following circumstances. An agreement is made between those who want to sell
items or virtual money (A) and buying players who want to attain higher levels inside the virtual
community (B). B pays real currency for items or virtual currency to A. A might take money or
real currency from B but does not provide the item or A might transfer different items to B.
Hacking can also occur to obtain other players’ items or virtual money. Hackers may try to gain
access to the game’s servers with other players’ ID and password and take their items and virtual
currency. Hackers also try to gain access to servers of game developers and copy virtual money
or high-priced items. They could also develop programs to create virtual money through
exploiting a bug.
It is difficult to determine how many item transactions are conducted in a black market without
established intermediaries. As of 2003, it was estimated that around 43% of item transactions
were direct. According to ItemBay, the black market mechanism leads to cyber crime. If direct
transactions can be diverted to a third party business like ItemBay, this could reduce cyber crime.
ItemBay also emphasizes that its cyber crime rate is only 0.01% of its transactions.

Munwha Ilbo, a major news agency in Korea, published statistics from the cyber terror response
center (CTRC) in April 2004. According to the CTRC [7], 70% of crimes committed by teens are
related to item trade fraud, which has increased significantly in the last few years. In 2000 there
were only 675 cases; in 2001 there were 2,193; in 2002 the number increased to 8,250 and in
2003 the total number of cyber crimes was 10,187. This rapid increase in cyber crime has
generated public debate about who should be responsible for this situation. It has forced parents,
academics, government officials, game developers, and game item transaction companies to
determine the type of actions that should be taken to correct this situation.

ItemBay exercises the following practices to secure a safe item transaction environment and to
avoid item trade fraud. It has set up a member monitoring system. This system allows ItemBay
members to regulate those who attempt fraud while conducting an item trade through developing
a blacklist that then is used to filter members. It has a system to verify its members’ credit
records and it has established a fraud compensation system to encourage transactions. If a fraud
case emerges and the member is able to prove that he followed the rules then ItemBay
compensates the member for any fraud damage according to pre-established criteria.

The Korean government has not yet found an appropriate solution to the problem of item trade
fraud. Due to the lack of flexibility of existing laws to accommodate the emerging cyber
economy in online game communities, many youths are charged as criminals.

According to Joo-Young Kim of NCSoft, in March 2004 the company asked the Ministry of
Culture & Tourism (MCT) legislate item transactions in real currency. It requested that MCT
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modify current laws governing music, video, games, and item leases. NCSoft also asked the
Information Communication Ethics Committee to prepare a draft regulatory scheme to limit item
transactions in real currency. NCSoft explained that these efforts are necessary to ward off cyber
crimes and to protect the copyrights of game developers and other legitimate copyrighters.

Kim explained why NCSoft decided to take this action. Online game communities can be
negatively affected by fraudulent item transactions. This in turn will lead the politics and
economics of these communities to develop differently from the game developer’s intentions.
For example, Lineage is designed to be updated every six months but such a plan cannot be
applied due to unexpected item transaction activities.

The crime rate in virtual communities is increasing, which in turn affects social stability in the
real world. Jeong-Woong Park, a game user, stated that online game developers already have
strong influence upon society and they also have to be responsible for it. As Park highlighted,
game developers are expected to consider the public interest as well as their profits both in the
virtual and real world.

Because of the increasing problem of cyber crime, the private sector is also taking precautions of
their own to limit the number of disputes or fraud that happen in the exchange of digital property.
ItemBay has strong security measures. To conduct an item auction, registration is mandatory and
it requires authentication of its members’ identity. The company requests the real name, cell
phone number, address, and other contact information such as company or school as well as the
residential registration number (RRN). The RRN in Korea is similar to the social security
number in the United States. It is illegal to misuse an RRN. If an ItemBay member provides
inaccurate contact details it can lead to an item trade failure and membership suspension.
ItemBay has obtained the cooperation of the Korea Information Service in order to confirm
registration information. They expect that this measure will reduce the number of disputes and
fraud that occur in these settings. More detail about the Korean case is available in [13].

VIRTUAL WORLDS IN CHINA
In spite of the profitability of major Chinese VW operators, close observation of the Chinese
case suggests that even the most successful VW operators are still in the early stages of the de
velopment of business models that influence business evolution [11].

China’s VW industry has so far initiated little innovation in terms of business models or online
game technologies except in developing some online real-time payment systems to facilitate
game distribution through various outlets and users’ purchase of online game point cards and
monthly cards. In the past, the focus of competition in the Chinese VW industry was on
4

improving distribution channels and operating efficiency. Though the technology and industry
have evolved over the past few years, companies still remain in the process of overcoming some
of the early stage obstacles that they have failed to effectively deal with so far. The industry is
currently moving through the second iteration of the business model stages, having to adjust to
new technical and environmental issues that were not anticipated in the first years.

Waigua is a type of software designed to automatically conduct activities for players within the
gaming environment in order to quickly increase their level even when they are not actually at
their computer. Waigua is thus similar to the concept of “gold farming” discussed in the online
game literature, where users develop macros that enable them to accumulate digital assets
without having to engage in the effort typically required to achieve this. To combat this problem,
online game operators and developers have to overcome both technical and environmental
challenges. Some operators have suspended or canceled accounts. A purely technical solution is
unlikely to entirely solve the Waigua problem, however, because financial incentives, technical
challenge, and the satisfaction of developing Waigua to defeat counter-Waigua technologies will
always inspire some to do this.

Private servers are an even bigger potential problem for game providers than Waigua. “Private
server” refers to the situation where the server source code is stolen, hacked, or otherwise leaked.
As a result, some people set up their own game servers using the leaked source code and charge
users for playing on their own servers. In many cases, these people do not even utilize dedicated
game servers but common Internet servers in order to cut costs. Not only do those people who
run such illegal private servers not pay any licensing fee to the game developer, they typically
charge players lower fees, which results in substantially lower revenue for the game operator.
The Chinese VW industry has been working closely with the government and law enforcement
authorities to crack down upon the usage and spread of private servers in China.

Another important issue in managing virtual worlds is the trade in digital items. When users
associate VW items with value demonstrated in real world markets, the developer might become
liable for loss due to circumstances within its control. Systems therefore must be protected
against hacking, cheating, and scamming. The company Arctic Ice, for example, did not
sufficiently secure its systems from hacking and in 2003 was found liable by Beijing’s Chaoyang
District People’s Court for a player’s lost virtual property [5]. This may be the first case of its
type in the world but others are certain to follow. VW developers have hoped to protect
themselves against litigation by explicitly claiming in end user license agreements (EULAs) that
virtual property has no real world value. If courts find, however, that users have a reasonable
expectation that these items hold value, the claim made in the EULA may not be sufficient to
protect the developer. These property right claims will need to be resolved before more
sophisticated transactions such as bartering with physical goods and seamless exchange between
virtual and real currency can be executed.
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One of the most important considerations for game developers and operators is to create a
positive environment using technical, non-technical, direct and indirect methods so that players’
virtual property and other items within the VW that hold value within the community are
protected [11]. Recent measures taken by Chinese game concerns to achieve this end include the
establishment of a group of independent game players with the mission of monitoring and
investigating every aspect of the service provided by operators that is relevant for players such as
customer service, performance of game masters, technical support, game-related dispute
settlement, and planning for new games. Such independent players monitor the above operational
aspects of game operators to ensure that it behaves in a fair and transparent fashion.

The above measures reflect controls by both operators and game players themselves. MacInnes
[11] developed a diagram, represented in Figure 1, to show the different levels of control that can
be undertaken in VWs. Hobbesian communities emerge when the developer does not set or
enforce rules and does not provide the tools to foster governance by the players. Panopticon
communities, in contrast, are under the absolute control of the developer, who sets and strictly
enforces rules without input from the players. Open communities are entirely under the control
of the users. Developers of such a community cede ownership of it to the players and maintain a
minimal role if any in its maintenance. Shared governance communities are likely to grow as
developers gain experience in managing social dynamics and begin to understand the incentives
and rules necessary to enable joint governance of their creations.

User control
Open
communities

Shared governance
communities

Hobbesian
communities

Panopticon
communities

Developer control

Figure 1: Control in Virtual World Communities
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Chinese game operators are moving toward the shared governance scenario, as can be seen by
their attempts to give players a role in developing a positive community atmosphere. Panopticon
communities have not been common in China’s VW industry, which may be related to one of the
national culture characteristics of China discussed at the beginning of this paper: low degree of
uncertainty avoidance. Chinese culture tends to tolerate, and in some sense even celebrate, uncer
tain situations where rules or goals are not clearly defined or multiple factors come into play si
multaneously. As a result, a Panopticon virtual community may not appeal to most Chinese on
line game users because its rules are meticulously stipulated and enforced by game developers
and therefore allow almost no uncertainty within the VW.

While the industry’s current focus on environmental factors will continue, it will gradually shift
toward factors related to revenue models. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Based on the framework
in MacInnes [11] it represents the business model as a dynamic process that encompasses a
company’s activities that would allow it to capitalize from the value it provides to customers,
which include technical efficiencies, environmental considerations, revenue streams, and
innovation over time. The factors that affect the success of a company’s business model at its
early stages are different from those affecting the business at a more mature stage. In the first
stage technical issues are of greatest importance. The second stage involves environmental
factors such as laws; regulations regarding aspects such as copyrights, privacy, freedom of
expression; and their affect on adoption. In the third stage, developers can begin to incorporate
traditional business model factors such as revenue streams, marketing, and customer support.
The fourth stage focuses on factors that will sustain the business. While still in early iterations,
the Chinese industry has matured somewhat, as can be seen by the movement toward listings in
overseas financial markets by companies such as Shanda.
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Figure 1: Trends in the Chinese VW Industry

The Chinese VW industry has relied on import licenses and needs to move toward a new model.
Barriers to entry under the existing model are low and it is increasingly difficult for companies to
differentiate themselves in a crowded market. Bargaining power is concentrated with the
upstream companies, usually overseas developers, and risk is born largely by local operators.
The online game industry has not yet been accepted as a mainstream format for entertainment
within the Chinese society and thus the government is likely to impose greater regulatory
restrictions to minimize their negative societal impact. Game users will also become more
sophisticated and selective as the industry continues to grow and evolve. All of these factors are
harbingers of greater competition. Some Chinese game companies are no longer operating the
products they imported from Korea. This may be an early sign of a shift toward a new approach.
More detail on the Chinese case is available in [12].

CONCLUSION
This paper shows that the initial technical challenges for business models have been overcome
but new ones are beginning to emerge as the industry evolves. The technical challenges are no
longer related to basic functions but to the environmental factors related to the running of a busi
ness of this sort. Companies need to be more concerned about security issues in order to prevent
losses of digital items that players see as valuable and worthy of trade. There are also many envi
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ronmental factors that these companies need to address. At this point issues such as freedom of
expression, control over user behavior, and jurisdictional disparities have not yet received the at
tention of policymakers because economic activities in these forums are an emerging trend. The
phenomenon of online games and virtual worlds remains new and will be subject to debate for
many years to come. It requires a major change in the assumptions under which the game indus
try has operated. Korea and China have been leaders in the phenomenon of virtual worlds and
they merit further study as their markets mature.
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